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ATIONALIT Y SEEMS TO BE NORMATIV E . If you fail to do 
something rationality requires of you, you have failed in a serious 
way. The charge of irrationality is, in  and of itself, a serious criticism. 
By contrast, other systems of require ments seem not to be normative. For 
example, if you fail to do something th at etiquette requires of you, or that 
freemasonry requires of you, you may not have failed in a serious way. These 
requirem e n t s do not have the genuine normative force that rational require-
m e n t s seem to have. 
Here is another way to make the poi nt. Suppose you are a full-bl o w n er-
ror-theorist about the normative. You hol d that all our talk of goodness, rea-
sons and oughts is systemat i c a l l y fals e – that the pr operties and relations such 
talk requires would be unacceptably “queer.” Would you nonetheless be will-
ing to grant that certain things are rationally required? Surely not. 1  But you 
might well grant that there are requi rements of etiquette and freemasonry. 
These requirements do not seem metaphysically threatening in the same way.  
Niko Kolodny (2005) and John Broome (2005) urge us to have doubts 
about these appearances. They raise the question of whether there is reason to 
be rational. And they cannot find a posi tive answer. They conclude that there 
are genuine doubts abou t the normati vity of ration ality. Call thi s the normativi-
ty problem . 2  
It is not obvious why the normativity of rationality should hang on the 
answer to the question Kolodny and Broom e fail to answer .  In the first sec-
tion of this paper, I suggest that the crucial assumption is the recently in-
fluen t i a l idea that reasons are the heart of the normativ e . I then argue, in sec-
tion two, that even if we make this a ssumption, the normativity of rationality 
does not turn on the ans wer to Kolo dny and Bro ome’s questi on. I illustrate 
this point wi th reference to the subjective reasons account of ration ality, defend ed 
by Derek Parfit (forthcoming) and Mark Schroed e r (2007, 2009), amongs t 
others. In section three, I consider why this point has not been more widely 
appreciated. My diagnosis is that the sub jective rea sons account is superficial-
ly similar to the importantly different transparency account , made prominent by 
                                                 
1  Indeed , anti-realist meta-e thic al views have taken ratio n a l i t y as their targe t. See Gibbard 
(1990). 
2  In my (forthcom i n g ) I discus s a slight l y differ e n t proble m under this name. There the 
problem is to answer the question “ what is the reason to be (instru me n t a l ly ) ration a l ?” This 
question assu mes, with the views under consid erat ion in that paper, that there is such a rea-
son, at least under certain conditions. Here  I am concerne d with the prior question of 
whether rational i t y is normativ e in the intuitive sense I have trie d to eluc idat e in the text – 
the sense in which mora l i ty and prud e nc e are norma t i ve , and etiq ue t te and freem a s o nr y are 
not. As I explain below, furthe r assumptions ar e required to connect the latter question to 
the forme r.  
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T.M. Scanlon (1998) and Kolodny (2005). On the transparency account, ra-
tiona l i t y seems not to be normativ e . I think it is often assumed that what 
goes for the transparency account goes for the subjective reaso ns account as 
well. But I argue that thi s is a mistak e.  A corollary is that the subjective rea-
sons accoun t has an impo rtant advan ta g e over the transparency account, giv-
en how plaus i ble it is that rationality is normative. 
  
1. Reasons and Rationality 
 
The normati vity problem starts with the following broad pictu re of reasons 
and rationality (Broome 2005, Kolodny 20 05). On the one hand, reasons are 
“extern a l . ” What you have reason to do does not superve n e on your non-
factive mental states. So, for instance, the fact that there is petrol in your 
glass can be a reason for you not to take a sip, even if you do not believe that 
your glass contains petrol. On the other hand, rationality is “internal.” If you 
believe that your glass contains gin, it  may well be rational to take a sip be-
caus e of this belief. 3  In this way, what rationality requires of you can com e 
apart from what reasons require of yo u. You might be rationally required to 
take a sip, although you have most reason not to.  
This does not settle the question of whether you must have at least som e 
reason to A, if you are rationally required to A. (Call this the reasons question ) . 
Nonetheless, the picture makes it plausibl e that the answer is negative. If you 
are rationally required to intend to tak e a sip, that will be because of certain 
mental states . For instance, it might be becaus e you believe tha t you ought to 
take a sip, or because you intend to dr ink gin and think that taking a sip is 
necessary for doing so. But beliefs and intentions are not the kinds of things 
to be reasons to take a sip, on the above picture. And, if what is in your glass 
is petrol, you seem not to have a reason to take a sip – taking a sip will be 
seriousl y unpleasa n t and harmful. 4   
How does this show that rationality is not normative? What is being as-
sumed is tha t there is a tight conn ection between normativity and reasons . 
And much recent work assumes precisely this. For instance, according to Jo-
seph Raz, “the normativity of all that is normati v e consist s in the way it is, or 
provides, or is otherwise related to re asons” (1999: 67). And, according to 
Mark Schroede r , “to be normativ e , is to be anal yzed in term s of reasons” 
(2007: 81). Many other writers share somethin g like this picture: reasons are 
the basic normativ e unit, and the rest of  the norm ative is to be explained by 
                                                 
3  The example is from Williams (1981). 
4  This may lead us to conside r more esot er i c cand i d at es for the reaso n to be ratio n a l . For 
instance, we might wonder whethe r the reason to do what rationality requires is that it is 
typica lly bene f ic ia l to do so, or that othe r wise we risk losing our stat us as agent s . See Kolod -
ny (2005): 542-7 for discussion. 
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appeal to facts about reas ons. Call this the reasons first approach to normativity. 5   
As examples of the approach in acti on , consider the following analyses: 
 
Ought  For it to be the case that you ought to A is for you to have 
more reason to A than not to A.  
Good  For A to be good is for ther e to be reason to value A (cf. 
Scanlon 1998).  
 
If these anal yses succeed , they explaine d goodne s s and oughts in terms of 
reasons, thus vindicating their normativity. So the reasons first approach in-
troduces a test for normativity: can it be understood in terms of reasons? 
And this sug gest s the reasons questio n . For if you can be ration a l l y requir e d 
to A when you have no reason to A, how could rational requi rem e n t s be ex-
plained in terms of reasons? 6  
  
2 . The Subjectiv e Reasons Account  
 
However, the reasons fir st approach does  not make a positive answer to the 
reasons question compu l sory. Consider the subj ective reaso ns account of 
rational i t y . Accordin g to a simple vers ion of this account, what rationality 
requires is what you woul d have con cl usive reason to do, if you r beliefs were 
true (Parfit, forthcom i n g : 36). This view is naturally suggested by reflection 
on the kind of case descr i bed in secti on one. Sup pose you are in the kind of 
situation in which you ought to be drinki ng gin, and you believe your glass to 
contain gin. Then you may be rationa lly required to intend to take a sip, even 
if your glass contains petrol. This mi ght be what makes most sense, from 
your perspective. The ex planation seem s to be tha t you believe something – 
that your glass contains gin – which, if true, would give you conclusive rea-
son to take a sip.  
More generally, the subjective reasons accoun t clai ms that to be rationa l 
is to respond to subjective reasons – believed propositions that would be rea-
sons if true. There are many complicat i o n s involve d in develop i n g an ade-
quate accou nt of this sort. 7  But, for the most part, the simple accoun t jus t 
sketched will be adequate here: 
 
                                                 
5  Other influent ial writers a ttra c ted to the appr o a c h incl ude Scanlon (1998) and Dancy 
(2004). For discussi o n and further refe rences see Schr oeder (2007): 79-81. 
6  The openin g pages of Kolodny (2005) also co nnect the normativity problem to the reasons 
first approach. The diagnosis needs a little mo dification in Broome’s case. For Broome, 
ought s are the basic normat i v e un it. Thus his initial question is : if rationa l it y require s you to 
A, does it follow that you ought to A? But, holdin g this to be answer ed negati v e l y, Broome 
goes on to ask the reasons question . For Broome , this is a test for normat i v i t y becaus e rea-
so n s are to be analyz e d in terms of oughts  (2004): 36-39. 
7  For some discussion see Schroe der (2009). 
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Subjectiv e For you to be rationally required to  A is for it to be the cas e 
that you would have conclusive reason to A, if your beliefs 
were true.  
 
On this view, it is very plausib l e th at the answer to the reasons questio n 
is negative . If you are rational l y required to A, then if your beliefs are tru e, 
you will have reason to A. But if your  beliefs are false, you might not. How-
ever, the subjective reasons account should not claim that, because of this, 
rationality is not normativ e. The reasons fi rst approach says that rationality is 
normative if rational requirements ar e ex plained in terms of facts abou t rea-
sons. But the subjective reasons acco unt does ex plain rational requirements 
in terms of facts about reasons: it explains them by appeal to facts abou t 
what there would be reason to do, if your beliefs were true. 8  Such facts are 
genuinely normative – they are, for inst ance, the kind of facts the full-blown 
error-theorist is committed to denying. 
This shows that even if we accep t the reasons first approach, th e norma-
tivity of ratio nality does not turn on the answer to the reasons question. The 
subjective reasons accou nt answers the question in the negativ e, but nonethe-
less implies that rationali ty is normative. Given the plausibility of the latter 
claim, this is an attraction of  the subjective reasons account. 9   
 
3 . The Transparen c y Account  
 
We might wonder why this point has not been more widely appreciated. My 
conjecture is that it is because the subjective reasons account has much in 
common wi th a different account, on which ratio nality seems not to be nor-
mative. This is Scanlon and Kolodny’s transparency account. This accou nt 
begins by claimi n g that there is only one basic requir e m e n t of ration a l i t y (Ko-
lodny 2005: 557): 
 
Enkrasia  If you believe tha t you have conclusi ve reason to A, 
then you are rationally required to A. 
 
All that rationality requires, on this view, is that we do what we take our-
selves to hav e conclusive reason to do . If we accept this, we can accept a very 
simple accou nt of what a rational requirement is: 
 
Transparenc y   For you to be rationally required to A is for you to 
believe that you have conclusive reason to A. 10  
                                                 
8  Errol Lord (ms) also make s this point. 
9  It is worth noting that the subject i ve reasons accou n t is not the only accoun t of ration a l it y 
to answer the reason s questi on in the negativ e but also explai n ration a l i ty in term s of rea-
sons. Garrett Cullity’s (2008) “stand ard-fi xing account” is another example. 
10  Kolod n y often state s the trans p a r e ncy accou n t as a claim about what we are saying in 
making attributions of irrationality: “ When we tell someone … t ha t he ought rationa l l y to 
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On the face of it, the transparency account is very similar to the subjec-
tive reasons account. Th ey seem to be slightly different ways of working out 
the common thought that what rationality requires is what you have reason 
to do, relativ e to your bel iefs. The only difference seems to be that the sub-
jective reaso ns account is somewha t broader. After all, if you believe that you 
have conclusive reason to A then, if th at belief is true, you have conclusive 
reason to A. So the subjective reason s account accepts tha t Enkrasia is a ra-
tional requirement – it si mply de nies that it is the only one.  
The transpar ency accoun t is generally taken to imply that rati onality is 
not normativ e. Kolodny says tha t it imp lies that “rationa l i t y is only apparent -
ly normative” (509). And again, that on  this account “[t]he (seeming) norma-
tive force of…rationality derives from a (seeming) reason, the reason that the 
subject believes he has” (558). 
Nicholas Southwood makes similar clai ms. He says that the tra nspar e n c y 
account: 
 
is obviously incapable of meeting [the normat ivity problem]. This is because, in under-
standing rational requirements in terms of no rmative perceptions or beliefs, it implicit -
l y conc ede s that they are not normat i v e. On the [trans p a re n cy ] accou n t, ratio n a l re-
quirements are simply descript ive claims about the percep t i ons or belief s we have re-
garding certain kinds of reasons we have. For this reason, the [transpa rency] account is 
better thought of not as a vind icat ing but as an undermining explanation of the norma-
tivity of rationality – as  an attempt to explain it away (2008: 24-5).  
 
If Kolodny and Southwood are right then, given the eviden t similarity be-
tween the su bjective reas ons account an d the transparency acco unt, we migh t 
expect the su bjective reas ons account to have the same result – that rationali -
ty is only apparently nor mative. 1 1   
I think this is a mistake. It ignores a further important difference be-
tween the accounts. As we have seen, the subjective reasons account explain s 
rationality in terms of facts about reaso ns. To be rationally required to A is to 
believe things that would give you conclusive reason to A if true. So the sub-
jective reaso ns account reduces ratio nal requirements, in part, to facts about 
what there is, or would be, reason to do. By contrast, the tr ansparency ac-
count reduces rational requirements to pu rely psychological facts. To be ra-
tionally required to A is just to believe that you have conclusive reason to A. 
But to explain rational requirements in terms of belief s about reason s is not 
to explain them in terms of reasons. So rationality is normative on the sub-
jective reaso ns account, but not the transparency account. 
We can clarify this point by recalli n g the heurist i c suggest e d above. Con-
sider an error-theorist motivated by the putative queerness of the normativ e. 
                                                                                                                         
have attitude A…[w]e are making  the descriptive, psychologic al claim that he has conc lu s i ve 
reason for that attitude” (2005: 557). However this makes the account vulner a b le to the 
open question argument (Hussain, ms: 18-25). I th er e f or e rest a te it as a metap h y s i c a l claim .   
11  Kolodny (2005): n.47 appe ars to accept this inference. 
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If the transparency account is correct, such an error-theorist could accep t 
that there ar e rational requirements. For it is no part of the error-th e o r i s t ’s 
remit to den y that peopl e believe they have reasons. But if the subjective rea-
sons accoun t is correct, the error-theori st must deny tha t there are rationa l 
requirements. For the proponent of the subjectiv e reasons account thinks 
that there are non-normative propositions  that are reasons if true. For in-
stance, he might think that the propo sition that there is gin in your glass is a 
reason to take a sip, if true. And this is something the error-theorist must 
deny. So the error-th e o r i s t should worry about rational requirem e n t s on the 
subjective reasons accou nt, but not on  the transp arency accou nt. Rationality 
is normative only on the former.  
 
4. Subjective Reasons and Enkrasi a  
 
The argument so far may seem too quick. For it is not clear that the subjec-
tive reasons account impl ies that all rational requirem e n t s are normativ e . For 
instance, co nsider the requirement Enkr asia. As I noted, it seems to follow 
from Subjective that this is a rational requirem e n t . This is beca use if you be-
lieve that you have concl usive reason to A then, trivially, you have conclusive 
reason to A, if your belief is true. But now notice that even the error-theorist 
can accept that if this belief is true, you have concl usive reason to A. So even 
the error-theorist can accept Enkrasia, if  Subjective is true. So, by the heuris -
tic above, the requirement Enkrasia is not norma tive, on the subjective rea-
sons account. 
My respons e to this objecti o n begins by denying Enkrasi a . Since Subjec-
t i v e implies Enkrasia , we must also deny Subjecti v e. But as noted above, Su b-
jective is only a first pass at a plausible subjective reasons accou nt. The ques -
tion is thus whether a better developed version of the subjectiv e reasons ac-
cou n t will imply that all rationa l re quirem e n t s are normativ e . We cannot 
properly answer this question withou t working out such an account – a task 
that is beyon d the scop e of this paper. 1 2  But I will offer a ground for optim-
ism on the part of the subjective reas ons theorist. 
A problem with Enkrasia is that it implies that even if you irrationally be-
lieve that you have concl usive reason to  A, you are rationally required to A. 
This is implaus i b l e . If you irratio n a l l y believe that you have conclusive reason 
to A, Aing may itself be irrational. Bu t it is implausible that you can be ra-
tionally requi red to do the irrational. To come at the point an othe r way, it is 
implausible that if you drop the irrational belief and do not A, you fail to do 
something rationality requ ires of you. 13  
A more plau sible version of Enkrasia – one that an adequate subjective 
reasons acco unt might imply – says that if you rationally believe that you have 
conclusive reason to A, then you are rationally required to A. However, it is 
                                                 
1 2  For some initial step s, see Schr oeder (2009). 
13  For this way of putting the poi nt , see Brune r o (fort h c om i n g ). 
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plausible that the subjecti ve reasons account will explain such requirements, 
in part, by non-tr i v i a l facts about reason s . This is becaus e whethe r you ra-
tionally believe something depends on a range of your other beliefs and men-
tal states. In particular, on the subj ective reaso ns account, it depends on 
mental sta tes whose con t ents are, or would be, reasons for this belief, and on 
the absen ce of states whose conten ts are, or would be, defeaters for this be-
lie f . Now the crucia l point for our purpos e s is that some of these states will 
have non-normative contents. But thi s me ans that we have returne d to the 
kind of facts about reaso ns that the e rror-th e o r i s t is committe d to denying. 
The error-theorist cannot accept that  non-normative facts ar e reasons, or 
defeaters, for belief. So if such facts are always part of the explanation of 
why, in a given case, you are rationally required to A, then all rational re-
quirements are normative – whenever you are rati onally required to A this is 
explain e d , at least in part, by non-tri v ial facts about what is or would be a 
reason. 
This suggests that an adequate version of the subjective reason s accoun t 
will imply that all rational requirements are normative. If so, this is an impor-
tant adva nta g e of the su bjective reas ons  accoun t over the transparency ac-
count. 1 4  
 
Jonathan Way 
University of Stirling 
Department of Philosophy 
j.m.wa y@stir.ac.uk  
                                                 
1 4  Thanks to Errol Lord , Mark Schr oe de r and Sam Shpall for very helpfu l comme nt s and 
discu s s i o n . I owe furthe r thank s to Errol , as the main ideas of this pape r were first formu -
l a t ed as a respons e (in corre s po n d e nc e) to his (ms) . 
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